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Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Women and Misyar Marriage: 
Evolution and Progress in the Arabian Gulf 
 





Women’s status continues to undergo rapid evolution in the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC). The modernization policies sweeping the energy-rich region has resulted 
in unintended social and gender imbalances. Partly due to the wealth distribution policies 
and the vast influx of foreign labor into the GCC, the region’s indigenous people are 
facing several challenges as they adapt to their surrounding environment. Improvements 
to women’s education have resulted in an imbalance of highly educated women relative 
to their male counterparts in the region, tipping the scales of gender roles. While both 
men and women accept predominantly paternal values, the strides in women’s status may 
be contradictory to traditions, customs, and expectations. As a result, high divorce rates 
plague GCC citizens, while misyar marriage reemerges as a temporary antidote. 
  
Keywords: Women, Islam, Muslim Women, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arabian 
Gulf, Misyar, Marriage, Legitimacy, Education, Progress, Women’s Issues. 
 
Introduction 
This paper will analyze the evolution of progress of women’s status in the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC), the forces driving the evolution, and its effects. The Gulf 
Co-Operation Council (GCC) is a union of six countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Bahrain. These countries are neighboring 
Arab countries along the Persian Gulf (referred to as the “Arabian Gulf” within these 
countries). Due to their similarities, they share a common language (Arabic), culture, 
religion (Islam), Islamic civilization, and a recent history of British colonization. 
Another similarity amongst GCC countries is that they are predominantly rich in 
fossil fuels. Four of them are Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
members with the exception of Bahrain and Oman. The GCC OPEC members possess 
over 60% of the world’s proven energy reserves, thereby depending on energy revenues 
for 50% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Ahmed 2010). Thus, urbanization 
within these traditionally nomadic societies is fuelled by energy wealth (Moss, Watson, 
& Zinyowera 1998, p. 246). 
The manner in which modernization policies have affected the role of women will 
be analyzed in this paper as it poses intriguing possibilities. High divorce rates in the 
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region will be rationalized through advances in women’s education and status in the 
GCC. Further, the manner that GCC society absorbs the changing tides of women’s status 
will be analyzed as well. In particular, this paper will examine the re-emergence of a 
temporary marriage contract, “misyar”, otherwise defined as “ambulant marriage” (Arabi 
2001, p. 147), within this context. 
 
Evolution, Progress, and Development  
The status of women in the GCC is changing as swiftly as quicksand due to 
modernization propelled by oil revenues. As a whole, (OPEC and non-OPEC members) 
the GCC contains about 45% and 20% of the world’s oil and gas reserves respectively 
(Hartley 2009).  Consequently, GCC governments have undertaken wide scale, strategic, 
top-down reform in efforts to transport citizens through the rapid modernization of their 
national economies. Nationalistic labor policies embodied in Saudization in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatarization in Qatar, Emiratization in the UAE, and their equivalents in other GCC 
states serve the purpose of educating, training, and building national citizens’ capacities 
to replace the high-level jobs of foreigners in each respective country. Considering that 
almost 50% of the region’s population is estimated to be expatriate (Kawach 2010), with 
foreigners dominating over 70% of Qatar’s (PPC 2009) and neighboring UAE’s 
populations, nationalistic labor policies are pertinent in order to address the GCC’s 
overwhelming population imbalance. 
However, the trickle-down effect of such inorganic policies is tipping the scales 
of socio-economic balances. Particularly, women’s status in the GCC is drastically 
transformed, to the extent that societal norms regarding the role of women are severely 
altered. Such generational gaps can be illustrated when comparing the roles of women 
within the same family. While GCC women in the Silent Generation (born in the mid -
1920s to mid-40s) were widely illiterate and accustomed to subordinate family status, 
their daughters born in the GCC-Baby generation (mid-late 40s to mid-60s) were on the 
receiving end of major civil and personal rights. Qatar can serve as a case study for GCC 
women’s increasing civil rights, as the country’s new Permanent Constitution of the State 
of Qatar in 2004 (Article 35) equated women’s rights with men. 
It is worthwhile to note that while women’s constitutional rights are equal to men 
in Qatar, Kuwait (Kuwait Constitution Article 29), UAE (UAE Constitution Article 25), 
Bahrain (Bahraini Constitution Article 4), Oman (Oman Basic Law Article 17), the Saudi 
Arabian Constitution guarantees “human rights in accordance with Shari’ah2” (Article 
26). Even so, in practice, women in the other GCC countries are still routinely denied 
equal rights to men. For instance, in order for Qatari women to obtain drivers’ licenses or 
travel abroad on their own, they must present the Ministry of Interior with a male 
guardian’s written permission, which must be annually renewed (as a maximum duration 
of time). As for driving licenses, in addition to male guardianship, Qatari women must 
establish that their living situation requires them to drive due to school, work, and/or lack 
of resources to hire male chauffeurs. Women in Saudi Arabia do not have access to those 
liberties with or without male permission, as the country’s application of Shari’ah law 
prohibits women from driving, travelling, marrying, or working without male 
guardianship.  
                                                          
2
 Shari’ah refers to Islamic jurisprudence. 
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However, progress is evident and hopeful in Qatar and neighbouring Kuwait. In 
Qatar, women were granted to right to run in and vote for municipal elections in 1999. 
Although none of the women won that year, in April 2003, one woman won the election 
and signals a sign of change in the country (Bahry & Marr 2005). In Kuwait, women 
gained their rights to political participation including voting and running for parliament in 
2005. Four women won parliamentary seats in 2009, thereby representing 8% of 
Kuwait’s National Parliament (UNDP 2010, p. 13). 
Having established that women’s rights have yet to be brought into complete 
equality with men in the GCC, it is important to recognize that progressive steps toward 
liberalization are being made in the region. Critics of GCC policies’ toward achieving 
equality for women fail to realize that swift progress has been made in good faith. 
Although limits exist, they are largely due to social incapacities to absorb such vast 
changes so quickly. The unintended socio-economic imbalances posed by top-down 
reform regarding the status of women are resulting in jolting phenomena that must be 
addressed not only be policymakers but by the people themselves. These social trends 
will be addressed in the following sections. 
 
Divorce Rates 
Divorce rates in the GCC and Arab world as a whole are alarmingly high and 
reportedly on the rise (Permanent Population Committee (PPC) 2009). According to 
Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA 2009), over 80 divorces amongst Qatari citizens took 
place on a monthly basis in 2009. As a result, Qatar’s divorce rate leapt from around 4% 
in 1989 to over 30% by 2009. According to the latest statistics available from all 
countries, Qatar’s divorce rate is ranked the highest in the Arab and GCC regions with 
the exception of Kuwait (PPC 2009). The fact that such a small country with a population 
of around 1.6 million people (QSA 2011) is experiencing such a steep divorce rate is a 
source of much trepidation. Most worrisome is that 67% of the divorces in Qatar are of 
citizens, which is a figure up to 17 times higher than the divorce rate amongst foreigners 
in Qatar. 
Qatar’s General Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP) attributes this 
stark phenomenon to the advances made in women’s civil liberties, educational 
capacities, and financial capabilities. What should be added to that list are social norms 
surrounding marriage and courtship, including engagement practices and social 
expectations of married life. 
 
Social Norms of Courtship and Marriage 
In order to understand the reasons behind these startling social statistics, the 
concept of “marriage” in a GCC sense must be culturally defined, upon which the label of 
“divorce” would apply differently. In terms of legitimacy, the majority of Muslim 
scholars agree that marriage is the key to stability, chastity, and long-term bliss. 
Moreover, marriage is seen as a lifelong commitment. That perception of marriage is 
evident in its contractual definitions across Arab-Muslim countries.  
In his book, The Status of Women Under Islamic Law and Modern Islamic 
Legislation, Jamal J. Nasir (2009, pp. 32-33) investigates definitions of marriage 
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governed by Shariah law in the following countries, and these are his findings. Marriage 
is: 
 Kuwait: “a contract between a man and a woman who can lawfully be wed 
to him to the end of tranquility, chastity, and the strength of the nation.” 
 Algeria: for “the formation of a family based on love, compassion, co-
operation, chastity of the two spouses, and the preservation of legitimate 
lineage.” 
 Yemen: “an association…[with] the objective… to build a family based on 
good companionship.” 
 Oman: “a lawful contract between a man and a woman, the objective thereof 
being chastity, and the creation of a stable family, under the guardianship of 
the husband, on bases to guarantee for them the discharge of the burdens 
thereof with affection and compassion.” 
 
Typically, the modern-day Qatari couple undergoes an arranged marriage under 
which the groom’s female relatives select a potential bride from a similar social standing. 
Upon her and her family’s consent, and even before the bride and groom glimpse each 
other (sometimes not even by photograph), marriage papers are drawn (El-Islam 1974, p. 
47). Legally, the couple is now married, even before ever setting eyes on each other, let 
alone holding a wedding reception. It is only then that the families feel comfortable 
enough in the eyes of society to introduce the now, legally married, couple, and let them 
share a few moments - under the oversight of family members. A lucky few will share 
supervised telephone conversations, and the more liberal of them will go on dinner 
excursions without guardians present. This process continues as the bride and groom live 
separately until the date of the wedding, which is usually 8-10 months later depending on 
the availability of highly demanded wedding halls (The Peninsula 2007). 
It should come as no surprise, then, after the wedding, newlyweds catch one 
another by surprise. Suddenly, marriages are broken apart even before they begin. While 
they are labelled as “divorce” in a technical sense, in most other countries they would 
fulfil the criteria of annulment since many of the marriages may have been merely 
documented on paper but not consummated, they can be likened to docile versions of 
other societies’ courting rituals. There are several reasons that may be behind this 
incompatibility, and will be reviewed within the subsections below. 
The foremost reason for young couple’s incompatibility is educational disparity. 
One of the most striking misconceptions about Arab women is that they are less educated 
than men. This is certainly not the case, especially not in Qatar where Qatari female 
graduates from Qatar University actually outnumber their male counterparts 
(Government of Qatar Planning Council 2007). This may be due to the fact that Qatari 
men are provided with the social capacity to study abroad, therefore earning their degrees 
from foreign institutions rather than Qatar University. According to the General 
Secretariat for Development Planning (GSDP 2009, p. 8), about 550 Qataris are pursuing 
higher education outside of Qatar, and 60% of them are men. Qatari women, on the other 
hand, traditionally have very limited socially acceptable prospects for their futures that 
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To illustrate, according to the General Secretariat for Development Planning (PPC 
2009), the majority of married Qatari women and men in 1986 were high school 
graduates (32.5% and 27.2% respectively). Meanwhile, in the same year, 21.1% of 
married Qatari men were university graduates compared to less than 9% of women. By 
2004, about 44% of married Qatari women obtained university level education, 
contrasted to only 33% of men in the same year (2009, p. 18). 
Since public education is gender-segregated, young women are encouraged to 
devote time for education and succeed academically. Qatar University, in this case, is 
perceived as a safe haven for single women to spend their time, as well as for married 
women whose husbands forbid them from work. Although there are six American 
universities with campuses in Qatar’s Education City (Texas A&M, Georgetown School 
of Foreign Service, Carnegie Mellon, Cornell Weill Medical School, Virginia 
Commonwealth University, and Northwestern University), the coeducational system of 
those universities is slowly gaining traction as an academic avenue for Qatari women. 
Currently, female university students at Education City are almost three times higher than 
men (GSDP 2009, p. 8). As illustrated in the graph below, Qatar Statistics Authority 
(QSA 2008) figures suggest that the majority of divorced women in Qatar obtained 









The result is intellectual incompatibility between Qatari women and men. 
According to the Qatar Statistics Authority in 2008, the educational status of the majority 
of married Qatari men was at secondary school level, while the educational status of the 
Divorces by Educational Level of Men and Women in Qatar (QSA 2008) 
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majority of the women that they married was at university level or above (QSA 2008). 
Considering that arranged marriages form the majority of unions, these differences 
between the educational levels of men and women are only discovered after the event. 
Emirati women (from the UAE) experience a similar educational imbalance as “the high 
proportion of Emirati women who are college-educated [are] less inclined to marry young 
Emirati men schooled in relatively patriarchal conceptualizations of family and marriage” 
(Hasso 2009, p.9). 
Financially, women are traditionally dependent upon men as the main 
breadwinners, however, despite that their educational status is often below that of 
women’s. Such is evidenced by the majority of Qatari men’s occupations in 2008 (almost 
90%) were clerks while about 86% of women were unemployed (QSA 2008, p. 103). 
This illustrates that the financial burden of marriage life is mostly on the Qatari men’s 
shoulders. Social norms, again, are the likely culprit for this trend. While Qatari men are 
expected to provide for their families, dual-income households are more practical for 
facing rising living costs. World Bank figures indicate that living costs spiked in Qatar 
during 2008 as the economy’s inflation rate stood at 15% (International Monetary Fund 
as cited in World Bank 2008). However, the majority of Qatari women were unemployed 
during that year, indicated either that they do not want to work due to social expectations 
of male support or that their husbands do not allow them to work. 
 
Dependence on Social Welfare 
The most overlooked factor, however, is that the all-encompassing social benefits 
extended to citizens by their governments may have stifled the ambitions of male 
citizens.  GCC countries’ welfare policies provide abundant resources to citizens, leaving 
very little to the imagination. From subsidized food and gas, to free electricity, water, 
healthcare, and education (Brown 2007), to nationalistic labor policies (Qatarization 
2010), business ownership laws favoring local citizens, and citizens’ sole rights to 
publicly traded stocks (U.S. Dept. of State 2010).  
A contemporary illustration of citizens’ dependence upon the state is embodied 
within the Saudi Arabian government’s announcement of plan to write-off Saudi citizen’s 
public and private debt (Ferris-Lay 2010). Consumer debt write-offs are not new to the 
GCC region. In 2007, the Kuwaiti government initiated a “debt forgiveness scheme” for 
its citizens, writing off their debt, which exceeded $1 billion (U.S. Dept. of State 2010). 
Consequently, the dependency relationship between Kuwaiti citizens and their 
government was also prevalent in January 2010 when Kuwait’s National Assembly voted 
in favour of the government writing off 6.7 billion dinars ($23 billion) of consumer debt 
(Saeid 2009). Kuwait’s Parliament, however, rejected the bailout, stating that it would 
destabilize national banks and open exposure to legal violations (Trade Arabia 2010). 
The debt write-off debate was ignited in Qatar, next door neighbour to Saudi Arabia, 
where an online survey indicates that almost 75% of the respondents were, not 
surprisingly, in favor of debt write-offs in Qatar (Kippreport 2010). 
While female citizens enjoy those public goods they are faced with social 
expectations to adhere to a paternalistic society. Also, some of the government’s, such as 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE have instated policies geared toward empowering women. 
While women still have the same social benefits as their male counterparts, they are 
encouraged to become more active social players. There is also something to be said for 
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the notion of overcoming obstacles. For women, driving, working, or even attending co-
gender universities domestically or abroad presents an obstacle to be overcome. For men, 
however, the challenge does not exist since those opportunities are already available to 
them. 
 
Rising Costs of Weddings 
Inflation in the GCC has been blamed as the main culprit for rising wedding and 
marriage costs amongst the region’s citizens, although social expectations of elaborate 
wedding parties shoulder a heavy portion of those costs. In 2005, inflation was above 
26% and almost 20% in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. respectively, and although it 
fell over the next four years, inflation stood at 9%, 18%, and 20% in those countries by 
2009 (World Bank 2009).  
There is a lack of scholarly data regarding the costs of marriages and wedding in 
the GCC, however, a report on marriages in the UAE estimates the cost of an Emirati 
wedding at about 300,000 Arab Emirates Dirhams (AED) or about $82,000 USD 
(Khaleejtimes 2006).  A study on neighbouring Egypt lends an indication on how the 
wedding costs are broken down. According to Diane Singerman (2007), the cost of 
dowry, jewellery, and the wedding party combined represents 20% of marriage costs, 
which are the second highest components of marriage costs after housing, which stands at 
32% (p.15). The report notes that about 70% of marriage costs are borne by the groom (p. 
13).  
News articles in Qatar and Saudi Arabia verify that rising expenses related to 
wedding celebrations lend to discouraging citizens from marriage. In Qatar, hikes in 
wedding halls combined with increased housing costs have been blamed for discouraging 
youth from proceeding with marriage (The Peninsula 2007). Given the economic, 
educational, social, and financial pressure on men and women in the GCC, an alternative 
marriage contract has surfaced as a temporary solution to the pandemonium, misyar 
marriage, which will be discussed within the next section. 
 
Misyar Marriage: a Conceptualization  
The combination of the previously mentioned factors – education, high divorce 
rates, social expectations of marriage, rising wedding costs, and disparity between men 
and women – may have lent to the reemergence of an early-Islamic marriage contract; 
misyar marriage. First, misyar must be defined. Misyar marriage is oftentimes considered 
a derivative of mut’a marriage, the former defined as a “travelling marriage” and the 
latter a “temporary marriage” (Nasir 2009). In both instances, the marriage is instituted 
for the mere purpose of physical pleasure, neglecting the other elements of an Islamic 
marriage contract which were outlined earlier in this paper, most significantly 
cohabitation of husband and wife, long-term commitment, and the intention of 
procreating. The difference between the two types of marriages lies in the time constraint 
placed on the union. While in misyar marriage the time limit is implied though not stated 
in the marriage contract, mut’a, on the other hand, is a marriage clearly defining the 
duration of the relationship within the contract (Nasir 2009). As such, Shi’ites deem 
mut’a marriage religiously permissible but Sunnis take the opposite view mainly due to 
the time limit placed on the arrangement (Nasir 2009). 
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“Misyar” is a loaded term, carrying several different meanings depending on the 
narrator’s frame of reference. The term’s literal translation into English from Arabic is, 
“travelling marriage”. According to Oussama Arabi, the Shariah (legal Islamic) definition 
of misyar is “ambulant marriage” (2001, p. 147). Arabi describes misyar as a “strikingly 
novel configuration, where human sexuality, economic status, and polygamous culture 
come together to forge new legal knowledge” (p. 148). 
Misyar marriage, in its legal definition, falls short of the traditional obligations of 
Islamic marriage, including co-habitation of husband and wife, and welfare provisions 
from husband to wife (Arabi 2001, p. 148). To simplify the term, misyar is a short-term 
marriage made both religiously and legally permissible in Islamic countries.  
As a practice, misyar has been embraced by some and rejected by others, notably 
women’s rights activists. Its definitions on the street range from discreet, tongue-in-
cheek, to unguardedly disdainful. Such variations in definitions are observable in the 
following explanations of misyar: “easy and temporary marriage” (Ibahrine 2008), a “no-
strings marriage of convenience” (Ahmad 2009), “legal prostitution” (Jabarti 2005), and 
“sex tourism” (el-Gawhary 1995). Disparities in the conceptualization of misyar marriage 
depend on the perceived morality of the arrangement. While some argue for its religious 
legitimacy as an institution of marriage, others (such as GCC feminist groups) judge the 
arrangement according to the intentions of those consenting to the union. 
With misyar, Islamic society may be far happier with consensual sexual relations 
as long as those actions are legitimized by marriage. Therefore, misyar may be seen as 
providing a utilitarian approach to satiating the sexual desires of Muslim men and 
women. This utilitarian perception of misyar marriage is supported by Syed Ahmad 
(2009) who affirms that misyar marriage is “popular... in a society where extramarital 
[or] premarital sex is a cardinal sin [because] it legitimizes sexual relations outside the 
framework of conventional marriage”.  
 
Social Function of Misyar Marriage 
Misyar marriage cannot be discussed without mention of the Egyptian Islamic 
scholar molding the moral framework of Qatar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a leading 
authority, one of the few remaining figures of Islamic scholarship, who states that misyar 
marriage is religiously legitimate. He adds that “there is no doubt that such marriage may 
be somehow socially unacceptable, but there is a big difference between what is 
Islamically valid and what is socially acceptable,” indicating that as long as both parties 
accept the terms of the marriage contract then they are legally married in the eyes of 
Allah (Al-Qaradawi 2006). 
The utilitarian aspects of misyar marriage are also highlighted by Sheikh Dr. 
Ahmed Al-Kubaisi, an Islamic scholar based in the United Arab Emirates who broadcasts 
his Friday sermons from Dubai to an audience of about 20 million people (McFarlane 
2007). An Iraqi senior cleric, Al-Kubaisi’s background was multi-religious in a Sunni-
Shi’i context. He states that legalizing misyar is a policy that is likely to alleviate society 
of the ills of spinsterhood, and prevent widows from sinfully fulfilling their sexual desires 
(Al-Kubaisi as cited in Fakih 2006). In this case, Al-Kubaisi considers singlehood as a 
breeding ground for moral corruption, which threatens the sanctity of Islamic society. 
From his perspective as an Islamic cleric, misyar legitimizes acts that would have 
otherwise been not only unlawful but sinful.  
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Self-constraint, Al-Kubaisi assumes, will lose the war against physical desire and 
temptation. Misyar, according to this principle, performs the function of legitimizing 
people’s pursuit of physical pleasure. At the same time, it provides an avenue for 
achieving sexual satisfaction without disturbing social norms. 
Both potential bride and groom may be interested in fulfilling the desires of their 
“sovereign masters”, pleasure and pain (Bentham 1780). While physical pleasure is the 
most notable one, there are also other desires that may be at play. In many reported cases, 
women generally enter into the agreement for financial purposes (Ahmad 2009). They 
enter into misyar under an agreement that some monetary compensation will be made. 
Other times, compensation is in an intangible form. Women are able to escape the 
burdens of spinsterhood, widowhood, or divorced life (Zakaria 2009). Therefore, to those 
women, misyar marriage is a socially acceptable option to enjoy enhanced social status, 
and defend alternative lifestyles. For men, misyar marriage is a means to fulfill their 
sexual needs without obligations to their wives (Karam 2006). 
Proponents of misyar may look to its utilitarian aspects for support. Perhaps those 
who dub misyar as a “temporary marriage” or “no-strings marriage of convenience” are 
utilitarian thinkers at heart. They perceive the marriage from a perspective of adherence 
to social norms, and operating within the confines of tradition. From that perspective, 
misyar is an ethically authentic approach to preventing “moral disruption and social 
disintegration resulting from unbridled sexual drives” (Arabi 2001, p. 150).  
 
Morality of Misyar Marriage 
Al-Qaradawi, while defending misyar marriage, asserts that "what matters most in 
contracts are motives and meaning, not the wording or structure" (2006). Opponents of 
misyar marriage would agree with Al-Qaradawi on that statement, however, based on 
motives (or “niyyah”) of entering misyar marriage alone, Islamic principles would reject 
the legitimacy of misyar marriage. According to the Islamic philosopher, jurist, and 
scholar, el-Ghazali, in the second section of The Foundations of the Articles of Faith, 
states that “a thing…may be pronounced unlawful from its very nature,” explaining that, 
“its very nature is that the cause of its being pronounced unlawful is a quality inherent in 
it” (c. 1094, p.25). While misyar certainly conforms to the moral law of containing sexual 
relations within the union of marriage, however, it fails to be undertaken for the sake of 
the moral law. If misyar were for the sake of the moral law, then women and men 
entering into the arrangement would commit to all of the other obligations of an Islamic 
marriage.  
Legal obligations of a traditional Islamic marriage (other than misyar) include 
financial welfare (“nafaqah”), housing, and children’s custody (Zakaria 2009). In case of 
misyar, the intentions of those entering into the marriage arrangement have been 
established as sex, money (el-Gawhary 1995), and/or social status (Zakaria 2009). 
Since misyar artfully evades those obligations, the marriage arrangement “may be 
pronounced unlawful from its very nature” (el-Ghazali c. 1094, p. 25). It is an effective 
means for people in the GCC to adapt to the modernization taking place in the region and 
reach particular ends – sex, finance, and/or social status – using each other as 
instruments. When the misyar marriage is over, there are no obligations to be made by 
either husband or wife involved in the arrangement. As a result, several similar marriages 
are entered upon the premise that no children will be born (Bajubair 2010).  
March 2011
                                    Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3                                     52      
Interestingly, one of the main supporters of misyar marriage, the Islamic scholar 
Al-Kubaisi, recognizes that the arrangement is a means to an end. In his opinion, the 
marriage is not an option for a “respectful” woman because “despite being [acceptable] 
according to Islamic Shariah [law], [misyar] compromises a number of values. If a king 
came asking for my daughter's hand [for misyar marriage], I would spit in his face” (Al-
Kubaisi as cited in Fakih 2006). Based on that statement, Al-Kubaisi reinforces the 
elements of misyar that el-Ghazali would likely judge as morally disgraceful from their 
“very nature”. Therefore, under el-Ghazali’s philosophy of niyyah (intentions), misyar 
marriage would be aligned with the term, “legal prostitution” (Jabarti 2005), and an 
immoral arrangement regardless of its legality. 
The rational for Misyar may be that Muslims are trying to reconcile Islam with 
modern sexuality. While Muslims are as susceptible to overt sexuality in the media, 
workplace, and everyday life, they are trying to abide by the tenets of Islam as much as 
possible while attaining sexual satisfaction. The openness provided by globalization and 
technology closes the distance between men and women who no longer solely meet under 
family arrangements but also at their own initiatives, thereby opening previously closed 
doors to sexual promiscuity that contradicts traditions.  
Therefore, misyar is also a chosen option by women who are dissatisfied with the 
expectations, conditions, and standards for traditional marriages. Educated, working 
women may desire to sate their physical desires and gain a closer intimacy with men 
within a religiously (morally) acceptable context without giving up their independence. 
Therefore, they agree to provide their own homes and live separate from their husbands 
in misyar marriages, perhaps with no intial interest in bearing children. Alternatively, less 
educated women with lower incomes (from countries such as Egypt), welcome misyar 
marriage as an opportunity to gain a financial boost for themselves and their rural 
families in a morally legitimated process at the hands of wealthy GCC men (such as 
Saudis). Meanwhile, religious scholars and clerics are quick to legitimate misyar 
marriage as an arrangement, overlooking the intentions behind the act, in order to 
maintain their relevance amongst constituents rather than losing them to worldly desires.  
 
Consequences of Misyar Marriage 
Wives taken as misyar wives and children born from misyar marriages suffer the 
most drastic consequences of the arrangement. While women are paid a dowry that they 
agree to upon entering the marriage, they lose financial support  and, possibly most 
significantly, on social recognition as wives. The “strategic secrecy” of the contract 
protects men involved in the marriage, who may marry up to four women (as is the case 
in traditional Muslim marriages) in the same manner without any responsibility toward 
them aside from dowry (Welchman 2010, p. 7). Women involved in the contract, on the 
other hand, provide their own accommodation, receive no financial support, and are not 
allowed to bear children as the marriage is only temporary and unknown to the rest of the 
community.  
Due to the secret nature of misyar marriage, there are not any published figures 
regarding the number of such marriages that have taken place in the region. However, an 
article published in October 2010 reports that 900 children were abandoned in Egypt by 
Saudi fathers as a result of this form of marriage (Sidiya 2010). The report adds that 
almost 50 abandoned children are registered in the Saudi Embassy in Manila, born to 
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Filipino mothers and Saudi fathers through misyar. Hasso (2009) confirms that a 
significant number of misyar marriages occur between wealthy Emirati men and low-
income Egyptian young women (p. 19), and journalist Ethar El-Katatney verifies that the 
highest number of visitors to “misyar matchmaking” website Misyaronline.com are from 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
 
Conclusion 
Women’s status continues to undergo rapid evolution in the GCC. The 
modernization policies sweeping the energy-rich region has resulted in unintended social 
and gender imbalances. Partly due to the wealth distribution policies and the vast influx 
of foreign labor into the GCC, the region’s indigenous people are facing several 
challenges as they adapt to their surrounding environment. Improvements to women’s 
education have resulted in an imbalance of highly educated women relative to their male 
counterparts in the region, tipping the scales of gender roles. While both men and women 
accept predominantly paternal values, the strides in women’s status may be contradictory 
to traditions, customs, and expectations. As a result, high divorce rates plague GCC 
citizens, while misyar marriage reemerges as a temporary antidote.  
Legalizing and legitimizing misyar is a utilitarian public policy as it aims to 
protect the sanctity of Islamic society by legitimizing extramarital and premarital sex – 
otherwise strictly punishable criminal acts (Zakaria 2009). Regardless of whether one is 
in favor of legitimizing misyar marriage or not, there are several social problems 
introduced by the marriage. First, women’s dignity is violated as they are expected to 
voluntarily surrender their rights to financial support and public recognition of their 
husbands. Second, and possibly most tragic and socially damaging, children born 
unintentionally in misyar marriage are victimized as their legitimacy and access to 
financial support from their fathers is drastically hindered (Bajubair 2010). 
Since Islamic clerics have proceeded with legitimizing this marriage, it is their 
social duty to provide remedies for these problems. If remedies are unachievable, then 
perhaps misyar marriages defeat the purpose of protecting society from far-reaching ill 
effects. From a utilitarian approach, the negative impacts of misyar marriages may even 
outweigh the benefits. Using that rationale, supporters of Bentham and Kant may reach 
an agreement that misyar marriage is morally unjustifiable. 
The first step to remedying this social phenomenon is to measure it. Considering 
the secrecy of the agreement, it is difficult to quantify, however, surveys may resolve that 
challenge. The numbers of children born out of such marriages must also be registered 
and published. Only then will the relationship between misyar marriage and social 
inequity be tested. GCC governments are encouraged not to shy away from depicting the 
harsh realities of these forms of contracts. 
Slowly, this trend may be resolved as traditions catch up with the region’s swift 
modernization. In the meantime, less binding courtship practices must be developed, 
which allow for testing the waters before diving into marriage. Even before that, perhaps 
most fundamentally, education, intellectual growth, and scholarly achievement must be 
prized amongst men as much as they are with women in the region. Once a higher value 
is granted to educational qualifications, financial success will take a backseat. This is a 
notion that will challenge modern materialistic values and replace them with cultural and 
educational roots. 
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